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Andrea Petö
Anti-Modernist Political Thoughts on Motherhood in 
Europe in a Historical Perspective1
After 1989, the demographic crises also reached Hungary in the form of the 
‘Second Demographic Transition’. At present, women generally follow the 
late fertility model, and in cities more children are bom out of wedlock than to 
married parents. According to data from the Central Statistical Office in 2006, 
35.6 percent o f newborns, or 35,500 children, were bom out o f wedlock. The 
traditional rhetoric o f domesticity, however, has received support from two 
unexpected places. On the one hand, there is the increase in the traditional 
public rhetoric of women expected to stay at home and have more children, 
and some aspects o f the recent focus o f the EU’s rhetoric on demographic cri­
ses can be used to support this argument o f domesticity (Kakucs/Petö 2008). 
According to the surveys, Hungary is one of the most family centered socie­
ties as far as values and attitudes are concerned, and one of the most individu­
alistic ones as far as fertility practices are concerned (Toth 1997). This change 
had already begun in the 1980s, in which on the rhetorical level ‘family’ as 
cohabitation and as a social unit comes with prestige while the number of 
marriages decreases and the number of divorces increases. The collapse of 
the statist feminist regime, which administratively supported the heterosexual 
nuclear family as a social unit, only accelerated the process. So how can we 
account for this contradiction: on the one hand there is the constant decrease 
in the birth rate (in 1989 123,304, in 2003 94,650) while on the other hand the 
rhetoric is more traditional than ever?
I would like to answer the question of the demographic rhetoric with 
reference to the normative motherhood of the Virgin Mary (see Petö 2003, 
2003a, 2008). I shall use the term rhetoric as Begriffsgeschichte following 
Koselleck’s term as “production and mediations of meaning” (cf. Joyce 1987: 
6). I will explore how the meaning o f ‘motherhood’ is produced in the present 
Hungarian political rhetoric and then expand my argument to other countries 
in EU.
This paper is based on my participant observations and life story inter-
1 This article was supported by European Association of Social Anthropologists.
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views with 23 women activists from the conservative and extreme right wing 
women’s movement in Hungary, where the number o f women’s organiza­
tions with a conservative agenda outnumbers the organizations with a femi­
nist agenda from 1990s onwards (cf. for the results o f the project Petö 2003, 
2006a, 2006b, 2008). (Accession to the EU just sped up this differentiation 
process inside the women’s movement even more.) I would like to connect 
the rhetoric o f the women’s movement underlining the common mobiliza- 
tional roots o f the neoconservative and extreme rightist women’s movements 
in Hungary as far as the rhetoric o f normative motherhood is concerned.
I would like to argue in this paper that the increasing right wing radical­
ism and anti-EU sentiments use the rhetoric o f Virgin Mary forms o f protest, 
agency and critique the heritage o f the communist emancipatory project. I 
argue that those anti-modernist political movements in Hungary and other 
parts o f Europe use the rhetoric o f normative motherhood in order to create 
a space for critiquing policy measures applied by the EU. To understand this 
political move, it is important to know that previously, similar to this policy, 
measures such as work-life balance were used by the failed leftist emanci­
pation project to create a space for the political mobilization of women (Petö 
2006a, 2006b).
The phenomenon of increasing right wing populism requires special 
scholarly attention in Eastern Europe for at least two reasons. First, the ex­
treme right wing radicalism and the existence o f oppressed conservatism ex­
isted as subcultures: oppressed by the dominant communist political system. 
Second, major changes happened in the gender relations during communism 
which were integrated in, appropriated by the programme, rhetoric o f the vic­
torious neoconservative politics after 1989 leaving the emancipatory leftist 
politics in a defensive position (cf. Held 1996; Ramet 1999; Mudde 2000; 
Petö 2003).
The academic literature is rich on transition from communism to liberal 
market economy and also on the rise o f anti-modernist thoughts, and I would 
like to build on one line o f  this literature (see Held 1996; Ramet 1999). This 
literature argues defining Eastern European ‘difference’ from a path depen­
dency position. Dividing it from the standpoint o f ‘Old Europe’ points out 
the changing family structures and demographic characteristics o f countries 
with statist feminist heritage. Using the difference as a descriptive and not as 
an analytical category diminishes the heuristic potential o f this position. Gen­
der studies scholars and experts were quick in explaining the political apathy
towards liberal feminism and the revival o f traditional gender values with 
inherent conservatism and traditionalism o f Eastern Europe using the Cold 
War area studies language. This argument during the enlargement process 
contributed to the marking process o f ‘New Europe’ as ‘the other’ painfully 
resembling some o f the characteristics o f the colonial discourse inside Europe 
(Funk 2004).
What are the consequences o f this scholarly approach? This approach 
first prevented the critical assessment of the statist feminist period, the period 
o f state socialism in Soviet occupied Eastern Europe, the failed leftist experi­
ment from assessing its results and advantages. Second, it also doomed the EU 
policy measures in ‘New Europe’. The EU policy follows the same directions 
and uses the same policy tools as the statist feminist period, the failed leftist 
emancipatory project with promoting increase in women’s employment as a 
measure and precondition o f emancipation and progress. This discrepancy is 
making room for anti-European sentiments.
Anti-Modernist Political Thoughts on Motherhood in Europe________________ 191
Rhetoric and women’s movements: normative motherhood and 
agency
The rhetoric of the emancipatory women’s movement: “New Woman” dis­
course was labeled by Rita Felski in her work The Gender o f  Modernity as 
“prisoners of progress” (Felski 1995: 11-33). In the rhetoric o f the women’s 
movement, women represent the new beginning, imagining future in a lin­
ear development as a  normative project. The historical meta-narrative about 
women’s past is hierarchical and exclusive while it aims to forge counter­
identity. The discourse of the emancipatory women’s movement is a strate­
gic discourse which is emotionally charged. Its language creates collective 
subjectivity with shared rituals, symbols o f meanings and stories. The post- 
1989 women’s movement, bom on the ruins of the failed leftist emancipation 
project in Eastern Europe, reached back to the symbols, rituals and stories o f 
the pre-1945 period. This led to the emergence of research on the Feminist 
Association and Rosika Schwimmer as forerunners o f women’s emancipation 
as a way of establishing political legitimacy (Petö 2007). The present day right 
wing women’s organizations are reaching back for symbols, for legitimization 
and for discourse to the central figure o f the politics o f motherhood, to the 
Virgin Mary, so there is an order to fill the historical continuity gap in politi­
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cal ideology caused by 50 years o f communism. I argue together with Roger 
Griffin, who pointed out “fascism itself can be seen as a political variant of 
modernism” (Griffin 2007: 6). So the anti-modernist emancipation is a neces­
sary consequence and parallel rival to the modemist women’s movements.
Analyzing the historical continuity, we observe that the cult of the Virgin 
Mary served to collect the anti-communist forces both in Italy and in Hungary 
right after World War II. Slovakia, Poland and Croatia can be added to this 
list. As Blackboum argued, symbols o f the cult of the Virgin Mary “were a 
rival set o f emblems” to the flags, anthems and monuments o f the modem 
nation-state (Blackboum 2001: 27). The criticism towards existing modem 
political Catholicism developed parallels with the social democratic move­
ment from the second half o f the 19th century. Therefore, in interwar Hungary 
these two political platforms were also represented in the Hungarian parlia­
ment by women. Female MPs signaled that the political parties considered 
women’s issues and women’s votes important. The two mobilizational frames 
constructed two different women’s movements: the social democratic, leftist 
and the Christian movements. Victoria De Grazia underlined in the case of 
Italy the richness o f Catholic civic organizations under fascism, against both 
liberalism and modernity that ironically underlay the rise o f fascism itself 
(Grazia 1992: 243-244). Also in Hungary during the interwar Horthy regime, 
political Catholicism and the different women’s organizations served as a site 
of resistance to the emerging fascist Arrow Cross women’s mobilizational 
attempts (Petö 2003). After 1945, the social democrats found the newly emer­
ging Communist Party supported by the Red Army in Hungary, also the re­
vival of political Catholicism. For the opening o f the Year o f Our Great Lady 
on 17th August, 1948 the Director of Actio Catholica, Zsigmond Mihalovics 
declared the purpose of the year as “a quest for us for spiritual renewal, intel­
lectual orientation, social forces, and the sources o f national life” (Mihalovics 
1947: 1). 1948 was declared the year o f the Virgin Mary by Cardinal Mind- 
szenty, head o f the Catholic church in Hungary, which
“aimed at deepening the traditional cult of Mary and strengthening the religious 
consciousness [...J not a question which is directly related to politics was men­
tioned on these days of Mary” (Mindszenty 1982: 176).
The same political and rhetorical fight happened in Italy around the cult of the 







The re-emerging cult of the Virgin Mary in Hungary in the post-1989 
context also served as an alternative political ‘set of emblems’. The same type 
of Kulturkampf has started. I would like to illustrate this rivaling set of em­
blems with the political rhetoric.
The emerging cult o f  the Virgin Mary as a set o f emblems and a political 
rhetoric is also interesting in the framework of resisting communism.
During communism, the stereotypical women’s characteristics as inti­
macy, sensitivity, family centeredness were labeled as a resistance to ‘state- 
ist feminism’, because these characteristics were relativised by the ‘state 
feminism’. The private resistance to communism was based on restoring 
the so-called ‘female virtues’ in the family, based on the cult of the Virgin 
Mary, which aims to preserve family values in private life against the pseudo­
equality o f state socialism (Peto 2003; Petö/Szapor 2004). The experiment 
of the social democrats to support autonomous women’s political existence 
failed. The wives o f communist functionaries were not visible, playing the 
part of the wife supporting the husband, so they were not able to construct 
alternative role models. Therefore, the untouched patriarchal framework with 
the normative cult o f  motherhood survived communist intervention into the 
family policy and reemerged as a victorious interpretative frame after 1989. 
The state-ist feminist failed to produce an alternative civic set of emblems. 
The previously dominant Christian iconographical patterns about women re­
mained unchanged despite the efforts o f the promoting female labourer as 
an independent individual. By the end of the 1990s, it also became clear that 
the “masculinization o f Eastern Europe” (Watson 1993) did not bring the re­
vival o f feminism, nor women’s movements with a  feminist agenda in Eastern 
Europe. The number o f conservative and/or religious women’s organizations 
in former Eastern European countries outnumbers organizations with explicit 
feminist agendas. Therefore, the analysis of why these movements are popular 
is a political and academic imperative today.
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The Hungarian version of the Virgin Mary, the ‘Woman Dressed 
in Sun’ as a site of resistance
I used different qualitative research methods as life story interviews, discourse 
analyses to explore the historical roots o f extreme right wing mobilization in 
Hungary who explicitly support the idea o f normative motherhood. First, I
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analyzed the publications and the striking theme of the Virgin Mary. Among 
the authors of books on these topics we find disproportionately more women. 
In 2000 I also used the participant observation method and attended sever­
al public lectures on the Far Eastern origins (Aryan, Sumer) of Hungarians 
analyzing the social composition o f those who are very active in lectures. I 
also participated in events organized by the numerous right wing civil or­
ganizations aiming to recover the historical ‘Truth’ about the origins of the 
Hungarian tribes conquering the Carpathian basin in the 9th century A.C. In 
the case o f this gender ideology, the facts related to the Far Eastern origins 
o f the Hungarians are not as important as the belief in their interpretation of 
selected historical facts. They reject the Finno-Ugric origin of the Hungarians 
and advocate that the imagined oriental homeland o f Hungarians was not in 
the Ural Mountain but in Persia. The legitimacy of this discourse refers to the 
sins committed by the communist politicians of science who did not support 
research on this field, which is according to them, the cause o f the present ig­
norance. The language o f Far Eastern origins of the Hungarians is a minority 
discourse; it was developed against the majority oppression and offers points 
o f identification for the participants. A typical argument says: “The Sumer 
language is the ancestor o f the Hungarian, those who are dealing with this is­
sue without a prejudice will not question this.” (Bobula 2000: 177)
The research direction o f the origins o f the Hungarians was decided in 
an unprecedented way in the history o f science with a decree o f Minister of 
Education Âgost Trefort in 1877 when he proposed to subsidize only research 
which would point towards the Finno-Ugric origin. After 1945, Hungary was 
under Soviet occupation so again that gave a special political push to prove 
uncritically the Finno-Ugric relationship. The anti-communist Hungarian em­
igration mostly in Canada, Australia and South America financed research 
proving the Aryan and Far Eastern roots o f the Hungarians opposing interna­
tionalism. Hungarian immigrants who left Hungary in 1945 or in 1956 living 
in Latin America, Canada and Australia played an important role in shaping 
the political rhetoric.
The results o f the participant observation I conducted also show an aston­
ishing overrepresentation o f women in events covering historical, linguistic 
and artistic aspects o f the Far Eastern origins o f the Hungarians. I formulated 
the question: why so many women got mobilized to listen to quasi-academic 
counter-discourse about the imagined and occult origins o f the Hungarian 
tribes while the gender rhetoric of these talks supported the traditional hierar­
chical gender regimes: women should stay in the domestic sphere and produce 
children.
This paradox of how a woman might be active in public when the public 
expectation is that she has to stay passive was solved with the post-1990 re ­
vival o f the cult of the Virgin Mary as a cult of maternity. This normative cult 
o f motherhood aims not only to strengthen ‘the nation’ but also regulates the 
order in the relationship between the two sexes. It has a potential o f regulating 
extreme forms o f masculinities (e.g. violence against women) which might be 
considered as a possible form of agency for women. I would like to narrow 
further my topic to focus only on the question of whether women’s agency 
can be found in discourses o f right wing extremism as an explanation for their 
political mobilization.
In order to explain why the figure o f the Virgin Mary is crucial both for 
the Hungarian political discourse and for the understanding o f the different 
levels o f women’s political agency, I need to focus on the normative cult o f  
motherhood. Motherhood is a social construct (Taylor 1996: 195) which is 
legitimized in three public discourses: religious (role o f Mary as mother o f 
Christ as a normative pattern for women’s activity in the public sphere), mili­
tary (identifying the body of the nation with the body of women) and quasi- 
scientific (women are the weaker sex who are the only ones to bear children) 
discourses. In the following, to explain why the cult of the Virgin Mary unites 
all right wing political forces in Hungary, I mention three discursive methods 
to analyze the cult o f Mary in the religious discourse: the analyses o f the fe­
male psyche, the feminist theology and the patchwork cult o f the Virgin Mary. 
I use the definition of Clifford Geertz for religion as a cultural system:
“Religious symbols formulate a basic congruence between a particular style of life 
and a specific (if most often implicit) metaphysical, and in so doing sustain each 
with the borrowed authority of the other.” (Geertz 1993: 90)
From this point o f view it is crucial to understand women’s experience in 
the religious discourse and practice around the cult o f the Virgin Mary in the 
Hungarian context. After 1998, conservative women were experimenting with 
the construction o f a new non-party framework. Following the example o f the 
influential pre-1945 women’s institution, they formed an umbrella organiza­
tion, the Alliance o f Hungarian Women at the Turn o f the Century (MAES2), 
which aimed to unite all conservative women’s NGOs. A new political party
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was also formed for women, the Party o f Hungarian Women, which labeled 
the preexisting political party framework inappropriate to represent the in­
terest o f national-conservative women. The changing structural framework of 
Hungarian right wing women active in politics can also be traced in the diffe­
rent religious and spiritual movements such as the Hungarian catholic renewal 
movements, e.g. Regnum Marianum. These movements not only oppose glo­
balization in their programme but they also fight for the revival o f the Hungar­
ian female saints o f the Aipad dynasty. The renewal o f the cult o f the Great 
Lady o f the Hungarians, which is not the Virgin Mary, also contributes to the 
spiritual revival bonding together the Catholics and the Protestants because it 
offers a social space for women to harmonize maternal and political duties in 
an approved patriarchal framework in the syncretic belief o f the Virgin Mary 
and pagan cult o f ‘Woman Dressed in Sun’.
As far as the women’s politics o f the national right wing political parties 
are concerned, they all put the normative cult o f  motherhood in the center. In 
the political language these parties have no ‘women’s politics’ but ‘family 
politics’, which covers the social role o f women by models offered by the cult 
o f Mary. The liberal-leftist criticism opposing the normative cult o f mother­
hood offers women’s individual human rights and the right to choose mother­
hood. This option includes the right to reject maternity, which in the conserva­
tive discourse is regarded as ‘national’ sabotage. During the newly emerging 
pro-natalist campaigns, the rhetoric o f the “6 million unborn Hungarians” 
during the fifty years o f communist rule in Hungary became a permanent part 
of the campaigns (Petö 2002) when reproductive practices were different. Re­
productive rights in Hungary were regulated following the intervention o f the 
Constitutional Court, which stirred public debates. The reproductive rights 
were,regulated by a decree which was labeled as unconstitutional by the Con­
stitutional Court in 1991, The public debates concluded in the legislation of 
reproductive rights in 1992 named as the law o f protecting fetal life. The law 
neither satisfied the feminists, who considered it a violation o f women’s hu­
man rights to have the fetus in the centre o f the legislation and not the mother, 
nor Christian and extreme right wing groups, who still considered the law too 
permissive and consequently anti-patriotic. In 1998 the Constitutional Court 
set a deadline o f June 30, 2000 to the Parliament to define ‘serious crises’ 
which in the text o f the law opened up the possibility for the pregnant woman 
to decide. While leftist liberal parties advocated protecting the human rights 
of the mother, the conservative right wing political forces demanded more
state intervention in diminishing the ‘serious crises’ (Petö 2003: especially 
187-199). During the newly emerging pro-natalist campaigns the rhetoric 
about the “6 million unborn Hungarians” during the fifty years of communist 
rule in Hungary became a permanent part o f the campaigns when reproductive 
practices were different (Petö 2002).
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Conclusions
The Hungarian right wing women’s politics is characterized by the quest for 
spirituality after 50 years of official atheism and with a strong involvement o f 
historical churches. The appropriation of the different layers of the cult of the 
Virgin Mary is a reaction to the profound social, economic and cultural changes 
o f the transition, which opened up room for agency for ordinary people and 
church hierarchy. It is also a response to the collapse o f communism, and a 
criticism towards neoliberal globalization returning to the pre-modem set of 
values and practices. The complex patchwork cult o f the Virgin Mary offers 
a position o f agency and victorious victim-hood of communism at the same 
time without the pressing moral need o f examining different forms of collabo­
ration with communism in the past fifty years. The success can be explained 
by the openness and flexibility of the political rhetorical frame of the Virgin 
Mary that it offers space for sometimes competing aspirations.
Victoria de Grazia used the term ‘post political citizenship’ to analyze 
fascist Italy, where she stated that tire identity politics served as a strategy for 
resistance and agency (Grazia 2000: 356). In contemporary Europe it is key to 
question how women’s identities were formed and what contents are placed 
there.
The question for Hungary is how the conservative (meaning non-leftist) 
women’s unity will be implemented, where the different sometimes-contra- 
dictory right wing discourses are represented by different political parties. 
The symbol of the Great Lady of Hungarians offers a possible site for uniting 
the different elements as Catholic, Protestant, ancient Hungarian, Sumer and 
Indian, which could also serve as a site for questioning patriarchy from an 
essentialist position still having critical potential. The patchwork character of 
the cult o f the Virgin Mary cannot resist the revolutionary reconceptualisation 
based on occultism. This new occult redefinition could be questioned only 
with order and hierarchy arguments, which means that this will diminish the
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potential agency o f conservative women in Hungary in the near future while it 
forces women to accept hierarchical arguments. As Judith Butler said:
“One thinks one is opposing Fascism, only to find that the identificatory source of 
one’s own opposition is Fascism itself, and that Fascism depends essentially on 
the kind of resistance one offers.” (Butler 2000: 173)
It will be very difficult to conceptualize the forms o f resistance to the norma­
tive definitions o f motherhood if the EU discourse on motherhood does not 
move away from the rhetorical and political trap described in this article.
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